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The Influence of Resource Quality on 
Technological Persistence: 
Charcoal Iron in Quebec 
Résumé Abstract 
Les progrès techniques survenus dans l'indus-
trie de l'acier au cours du XIXe siècle ont mené 
au remplacement du charbon de bois, com-
bustible végétal, par le coke, combustible 
minéral. Les aspects de la technologie mise au 
point pour utiliser le coke, cependant, étaient 
aussi applicables aux fourneaux à charbon de 
bois. Le Québec était le centre de l'industrie 
canadienne de la sidérurgie au XIXe siècle mais 
les progrès techniques introduits dans le pro-
cessus de fonte du fer par le charbon de bois n'y 
étaient pas acceptés comme ils l'étaient ailleurs. 
L'auteur voit dans les caractéristiques du mine-
rai utilisé au Québec et dans le type de charbon 
de bois disponible localement l'explication de 
la persistance de la vieille technique au char-
bon de bois dans les fonderies du Québec. Cette 
conservation de la vieille technique constituait 
une réponse raisonnable des maîtres des forges 
aux conditions locales. En outre, au Canada, 
pendant la plus grande partie du XIXe siècle, 
l'étroitesse du marché national n 'incitait guère 
à adopter des technologies à grande échelle. 
L'expérience québécoise touchant l'utilisation 
du charbon de bois pour produire de la fonte 
illustre la subtile combinaison de facteurs qui 
intervient dans l'évaluation des changements 
techniques par leurs éventuels bénéficiaires. 
; « i ; 
An essential element in the industrialization 
of Europe and its overseas settlements was 
improvement in capital goods of all kinds. The 
cost of producing these goods declined and 
production increased in large part because the 
cost and quality of ferric metals improved. By 
far the most important change in iron and steel 
manufacture was the substitution of mineral 
fuel (coke) for vegetable fuels (wood and char-
coal). The use of mineral fuel was a funda-
Technological advances in the steel industry 
during the nineteenth century led to the dis-
placement of charcoal, a vegetable fuel, by 
coke, a mineral fuel. Aspects of the technology 
developed to utilize coke, however, were also 
applicable to charcoal blast furnaces. The 
province of Quebec was the centre of the Cana-
dian iron-making industry during the nine-
teenth century, but the technological advances 
introduced into processes for smelting iron with 
charcoal were not accepted in that province as 
they were elsewhere. The author looks to char-
acteristics of the ore used in Quebec and the type 
of charcoal available locally to explain the per-
sistence of old charcoal technology in Quebec 
iron smelters. The retention of old technology 
by Quebec iron-makers was a sensible response 
to local conditions. Moreover the small Cana-
dian domestic market provided little incentive 
to adopt large-scale technologies during most 
of the nineteenth century. The Quebec experi-
ence with charcoal iron manufacture illustrates 
the subtle blend of factors that are involved in 
the assessment of technological change by 
potential beneficiaries. 
mentally important innovation which occurred 
gradually over two centuries.1 During the pro-
cess of transition the iron industry continued 
to use both charcoal and coke fuels for a vari-
ety of purposes, including the primary stage of 
smelting in the blast furnace. 
The prolonged survival of charcoal blast 
furnaces is a celebrated example of techno-
logical persistence. Charcoal furnaces sur-
vived as long as they did partly because their 
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performance was enhanced by the use of engi-
neering principles adapted, ironically, from 
coke-based furnace technology. In a sense there 
was a transition within the transition as im-
provements first developed in coke smelting 
were applied to the manufacture of iron with 
charcoal.2 
One of the puzzles about improvements in 
charcoal smelting is that they were not adopted 
everywhere. The knowledge of productivity 
gains through modernization was widespread, 
but some charcoal iron-producing regions failed 
to make the transition. A relevant example is 
the charcoal iron manufacture industry in Que-
bec which declined in part because of its fail-
ure to modernize. Faucher explains the lack of 
coke-smelting in Quebec by the high price of 
coal.3 Altman, on the other hand, has argued 
that the price of coal was not an important 
locational influence among Quebec manufac-
turers.4 Presumably everyone would agree that 
the price of coal cannot explain the failure to 
adopt improvements in the manufacture of 
iron with charcoal. In this paper I suggest that 
technical failure can be explained by certain 
characteristics of Quebec natural resources 
which appear to have inhibited the adoption 
of available technological improvements. 
The Industry in Quebec 
A brief survey of charcoal iron-smelting in 
nineteenth-century British North America pro-
vides a useful context for an examination of 
activity in Quebec. During the late 1840s char-
coal iron plants were erected at two sites near 
the Bay of Fundy. On the upper stretches of the 
Saint John River, secondary iron producers 
from Saint John built one blast furnace which 
produced sporadically until the depression of 
the 1870s.5 A more successful venture began 
at the same time near the head of the Bay of 
Fundy at Londonderry, Nova Scotia. The Lon-
donderry ironworks produced charcoal bar 
from 1850 to 1853 and charcoal pig until 1876, 
in which year the company blew in two new 
coke-burning furnaces. The shift was unsuc-
cessful; the company continued producing at 
less than capacity and on the brink of bank-
ruptcy until its furnaces were blown out for the 
final time in 1910. As in the case of Woodstock 
and earlier Maritime furnaces, Londonderry 
was handicapped by a local supply of ore which 
was inadequate in both quality and quantity.6 
The centre of Canadian iron production 
since the eighteenth century had been further 
west, near Trois-Rivières in Quebec, in which 
region Saint-Maurice Forges was the longest 
surviving blast furnace. By the 1850s this site 
had fallen under the influence of a Montreal-
based family, the McDougalls, who subse-
quently owned or managed most of the blast 
furnaces operating in Quebec.7 The McDougall 
family was interested in furnaces at L'Islet, 
Radnor-des-Forges, Saint-Pie-de-Guire, Sha-
winigan and Saint-Maurice. Production began 
to shift away from the Trois-Rivières area with 
the construction of a direct reduction bloomery 
at the mouth of the Moisie River in 1867, and 
blast furnaces at Baie-Saint-Paul in 1873, at 
Hull in 1867 and on the Saint-François River 
in 1869. John McDougall purchased the Saint-
François site in 1873 and then relocated to 
larger facilities at Drummondville in 1880.8 
The myriad of small charcoal furnaces in 
eastern Canada produced an expansion of 
national output in the third quarter of the nine-
teenth century. During the mid 1870s, however, 
a serious commercial dislocation put a num-
ber of furnaces out of blast. National output did 
not recover until a new furnace was erected at 
Radnor, Quebec, in 1890.9 By itself this furnace 
managed to restore Canadian output to the 
level that had been experienced in 1870. 
The Radnor furnace doubled Quebec output. 
Nevertheless, Quebec's share of the Canadian 
market for charcoal iron began to decline at the 
same time, as is clear from the data presented 
in Table 1. The relative decline in Quebec was 
soon followed by an absolute decline which 
reflects the re-emergence of smelting in Ontario. 
A number of furnaces were active in Ontario 
Table 1: Quebec Charcoal Iron Output and Share 
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volume 18 and Manuscript Group 29 B15, Robert Bell Papers; 
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before 1850 but none survived into the second 
half of the century. There were attempts to 
begin production at a variety of sites, but none 
succeeded until a large charcoal furnace was 
erected at Deseronto in 1898.10 
Deseronto's New Furnace 
The success of the Deseronto furnace lay in its 
deviation from the industrial practice in Que-
bec, the Maritimes and, for that matter, early 
Ontario. The new furnace used a high-pressure 
blast heated to a relatively high temperature 
which permitted much larger production and 
a reduction in input requirements. According 
to one report, the Deseronto furnace was 59 feet 
(17.9 metres) tall and 10.5 feet (3.2 metres) 
wide at the boshes, with a steel shell and cast 
iron water jacket, steam-powered blast heated 
to 900°F (482°C); daily capacity reached 
100 tons (90.7 tonnes) per day by 1913." Char-
coal was produced at lower cost by using spe-
cial kilns from which waste gas could be 
collected, reprocessed or distilled, and then 
sold separately as liquid chemicals. Finally, 
the Deseronto furnace brought ore from Lake 
Superior by ship and wood/charcoal from cen-
tral Ontario by rail rather than relying on local 
supplies ofraw materials. This strategy enabled 
the Deseronto furnace to increase production 
until the eve of World War I when its annual 
output was more than twice that of the entire 
Canadian industry before 1900. 
It is worth considering some of these tech-
nical changes in more detail. In 1870 most 
North American charcoal furnaces had a max-
imum daily capacity of 10 tons (9.7 tonnes), a 
squat shape less than 40 feet (12.2 metres) tall, 
a stone or masonry shell, a water-powered blast 
less than 1 pound per square inch (psi) (6.9 kPa) 
at less than 400°F (204°C), if heated at all. Fur-
naces of this type, characterized by Schallen-
berg as "pre-industrial," typically obtained 
charcoal in pits or rectangular kilns within a 
10 mile (16 kilometre) radius of the furnace. In 
1870 Pennsylvania, for example, 89 per cent of 
the charcoal furnaces were less than 40 feet 
(12.2 metres) in height; 78 per cent produced 
less than 2500 tons (2227 tonnes) per year; and 
very few heated their blast.12 
During the following decades charcoal fur-
naces began to implement changes pioneered 
on coke-fired furnaces. One development was 
to increase temperature and pressure at which 
oxygen was fed to the molten brew. A hotter and 
harder blast permitted faster smelting and 
hence greater output. A taller and thinner fur-
nace was needed to accommodate a larger and 
faster-descending charge. Blast temperature 
and pressure, the scale of output and furnace 
shape changed together in an evolution that 
brought dramatic increases in the productivity 
of labour, capital and fuel in charcoal furnaces 
precisely as had been experienced in coke 
furnaces.13 
During the 1870s, ironworks in Michigan led 
the move to taller and harder-driven furnaces.14 
By the 1880s a "modern" charcoal furnace typ-
ically produced 30 to 35 tons (27 to 32 tonnes) 
per day; it had a slim shape not uncommonly 
reaching to 60 feet (18.2 metres), an iron or steel 
shell cooled by a waterjacket, steam-powered 
blast at greater than 3 psi (20.7 kPa) and often 
in excess of 1000°F (538°C). The energy to heat 
the blast derived from furnace and kiln waste 
gas captured in entrapment devices with mul-
tiple bells and downcomers and then fired in 
regenerative fire-brick blast stoves. Beehive 
kilns or retorts permitted the recovery of chem-
ical byproducts during carbonization.15 Rail-
ways drew charcoal over hundreds of miles.16 
During this period of considerable technical 
change among American blast furnaces, the 
design of furnaces in Quebec changed sur-
prisingly little. The second Drummondville 
furnace erected in 1881 was only 32 feet 
(9.8 metres) tall, of brick and stone construc-
tion, with a capacity of 7-10 tons (6-9 tonnes) 
per day, hand-charged, water-powered at less 
than 1 psi (6.9 kPa), with a maximum blast tem-
perature of 300°F (149°C) and waste gas recov-
ery at the stack head by an old-fashioned pipe 
stove. Charcoal was produced in pits and rect-
angular kilns with no byproduct recovery; char-
coal was drawn entirely from local sources.17 
At Radnor in 1890 the iron-masters George 
and A. T. Drummond attempted to design a 
more modern plant with a waterjacket structure 
for the furnaces, Weimer blowing engines, bell-
and-hopper recovery of furnace gases and rail-
way transport of charcoal. The company's 
promotional literature also invoked the rhetoric 
of modernity but, somewhat surprisingly, the 
Radnor furnace retained important elements of 
the pre-industrial technology complex. No 
effort was made to recover chemical byproducts 
from charcoal production and at least some of 
the charcoal continued to be burned in open 
pits. Most importantly, the furnace was small 
(20-25 tons [18-23 tonnes] daily capacity) and 
short (40 feet [12.2 metres] tall) with relatively 
low blast pressure.18 
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The Quebec failure to modernize more fully 
contrasts sharply with the experience at 
Deseronto, Ontario. One explanation for tech-
nological backwardness in Quebec might be a 
lack of information or some innate reluctance 
to change on the part of the iron-masters. Such 
arguments are not credible. The McDougalls 
and the Drummonds held memberships in pro-
fessional associations which published regular 
information about technical advances in the 
iron trades. Employees of the Geological Sur-
vey of Canada, acquaintances in the engineer-
ing community, and most of all the buyers of 
charcoal iron undoubtedly supplied informa-
tion about possible improvements in furnace 
practice. Indeed, there is considerable evi-
dence that the Quebec furnaces experimented 
with hard-driven, higher volume production.19 
Another possible explanation for the small 
size of Quebec furnaces is a limited supply of 
raw materials in any one location. Again, the 
explanation is unpersuasive. Local supplies 
of wood and ore are unlikely to have been a con-
straint after the railways became available to 
draw material from a wider region.20 If indi-
vidual furnaces were limited by the size of 
local resource supplies, then we would have 
expected to find small furnaces each exploit-
ing local pockets of wood and ore. In fact, no 
more than three - and typically fewer - Que-
bec furnaces were in operation at any one time. 
We also would have anticipated that the 
demand for materials would have pushed up 
their prices. In fact, the price of charcoal at 
Radnor in 1900 was one-third less than it had 
been at Saint-Maurice 25 years earlier; the cost 
of Quebec ore was increasing but it remained 
below the cost at other Canadian furnaces.21 
A third explanation for the late arrival of 
"modern" charcoal smelting, that of market 
size, is more promising. The U.S. tariff and 
overcapacity in the American industry reduced 
export potential and largely restricted Canadian 
furnaces to the domestic market during the 
1880s and 1890s. The principal market for 
charcoal iron at the time was the manufacture 
of railway car wheels and malleable castings (for 
car components and agricultural machinery), 
each of which grew quickly under tariff pro-
tection in the late nineteenth century. In spite 
of this growth in demand, however, the entire 
Canadian consumption of charcoal iron during 
die 1880s was less than the output of a single 
"modern" charcoal iron furnace.22 By the late 
1890s, however, domestic consumption had 
increased to the point that the market would 
absorb the output of a "modern" furnace. 
The Impact of Local Resources 
The smallness of the Canadian market helps to 
explain the absence of hard-driven, large-scale 
charcoal furnaces during the 1870s and 1880s, 
but it cannot explain the relocation from Que-
bec to Ontario during the 1890s. Why was the 
"modern" approach introduced into Ontario 
rather than Quebec which, for more than a 
century, had been the Canadian centre of iron 
and chemical production? A large part of the 
explanation appears to be the quality of local 
resources. Ore in Quebec was obtained by 
dredging the bottom of lakes and bogs.23 Bog 
ore is more finely divided and hence more eas-
ily combustible than most rock ores; the earli-
est European blast furnaces used bog ore for diis 
reason.24 By the end of the nineteenth century, 
however, a more important physical property 
of an ore was its ability to support the weight 
of a large burden in descent. Bog ore is unsat-
isfactory in this respect because fine material 
in the furnace charge tends to pack too closely; 
in large furnaces the result is agglomeration and 
an irregular descent of the charge. The effect is 
to increase fuel consumption and impair the 
quality of the iron.25 In extreme cases, the mate-
rial might "hang-up" and block the escape of 
waste gases, which eventually would lead to 
an explosion.26 
Another drawback of bog ore was its rela-
tively high proportion of silicon, since the 
desirable properties of charcoal iron depended 
to a large extent on having a low silicon level.27 
This disadvantage weighted heavily on hot-
blast smelting since a hotter furnace tends to 
pass the silicon into the iron rather than leav-
ing it in the waste slag. 
In a number of respects, the structural and 
chemical characteristics of bog ore impeded the 
introduction of modern smelting techniques. 
Another set of difficulties originated with the 
quality of Quebec charcoal. The forest in the 
lower Saint Lawrence River watershed was 
almost entirely softwood.28 Most North Amer-
ican charcoal furnaces used hardwood, which 
contained more energy per unit volume and 
hence increased output for given size of fur-
nace.29 Other advantages of hardwood charcoal 
included its resistance to breakage during trans-
portation and its greater structural strength, 
enabling it to support a larger burden in die fur-
nace. Finally, the carbonization of hardwood 
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released marketable chemical byproducts which 
were unavailable from softwood.30 
Quebec iron-masters sensibly declined to 
adopt the new techniques for the simple rea-
son that they brought little advantage on soft-
wood charcoal and bog ore. The resources 
available at Deseronto, by contrast, were more 
amenable to productivity gain through hard 
driving and byproduct recovery. The Deseronto 
works had access to stands of hardwood in 
central Ontario via rail and river and to the 
superb low-silicon rock ores from upper Michi-
gan and Wisconsin via lake shipping.31 
Although the technological transition in 
Canadian charcoal iron reflects the peculiar 
character of raw materials in Quebec, the indus-
try was typical of many Canadian entreprises 
serving the domestic market. During the nine-
teenth century, American import restrictions 
and the small size of the domestic market 
impeded the adoption of large-scale technology 
in a variety of Canadian industries. The burden 
of smallness diminished, however, with the 
rapid settlement of the Canadian west around 
1900. Western-led growth contributed to a 
remarkable acceleration of domestic economic 
activity which expanded the potential market 
for individual firms and encouraged the con-
struction of larger plants, embodying new tech-
nology.32 Not surprisingly, productivity growth 
accelerated in a number of Canadian industries 
exactly as it did in charcoal iron smelting.33 
The experience of charcoal iron also speaks 
to a second major issue for Canadian histori-
ans of technology; the role of natural resources. 
It is widely recognized that the availability of 
natural resources influences international pat-
terns of growth and technical change.34 In 
Canada this insight is reflected in the popularity 
of the "staple theory." Most natural resources, 
however, have a quality dimension which has 
important economic and technological impli-
cations even if it is difficult for today's histo-
rian to discern. The example of charcoal iron 
manufacture in Quebec underlines the need to 
investigate the quality as well as the quantity 
of resources in any discussion of the relation-
ship between resources and industrialization. 
Implications for Technological Change 
Finally, it is worth considering the implica-
tions of this case study for our conception of 
technological change in its largest sense. Social 
scientists view technological change as an 
incremental process of many small advances 
leading to a gradual advance of productivity and 
in the standard of living. From this perspective 
it is tempting to see the inexorable wheel of 
technological change turning at a steady rate, 
faster in some countries than in others, but 
with few abrupt changes or discontinuities. 
Historians and engineers, on the other hand, 
tend to focus on particular clusters of innova-
tions which are arguably more important than 
others and which give the appearance of dis-
crete changes and dramatic breakthroughs. 
One way to reconcile the two approaches is to 
consider the persistence of old technology and 
the protracted transition from old to new in 
commercial practice.35 
Many new technologies experience a long 
period of minor improvements before their 
full potential is realized and widespread 
adoption is warranted. Institutional factors, 
the local availability of critical inputs and other 
influences can also slow the transition from old 
to new. Since the aggregate mix of technolog-
ical practice changes little from one year to 
the next, there are no dramatic turning points. 
This does not deny discontinuity in innovation 
and the first use of techniques, some of which 
are clearly more important than others. In a 
sense the continuity and discontinuity per-
spectives are both correct; they simply look 
at different aspects of the same process. Social 
scientists use aggregate data which reflect aver-
age practice and change more or less continu-
ously. Engineers and historians focus more 
directly on the irregular advance of the margin 
of innovation. 
The reconciliation of alternate perspectives 
naturally focuses attention on the circum-
stances of technological transition. We are 
interested in identifying influences at the micro 
level which account for the persistence of old 
technology, and hence a more continuous tech-
nological path at a macro level. Why does 
average practice lag behind the margin of best 
practice? Why do old technologies persist as 
long as they do? 
The standard economic explanation for tech-
nological persistence tends to emphasize cheap 
labour and a high interest rate since newer 
technologies tend to be more capital-intensive 
and their introduction requires new invest-
ment.36 The movement of charcoal smelting 
from Quebec to Ontario does not lend support 
to a monocausal explanation rooted in rela-
tive factor prices inasmuch as the capital/labour 
price ratio cannot have differed greatly between 
Quebec and Ontario.37 Rather, the story outlined 
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in this paper confirms the value of a more 
sophisticated model encompassing influences 
such as market size and subtle variations in the 
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